Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) by Sylvan, Kurt
Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) 
 
 
 
Kurt L. Sylvan 
University of Southampton 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Evidentialism and virtue epistemology (VE) looked like markedly divergent theories for many years 
after their early formulations in Conee and Feldman (1985) and Sosa (1991).  Their divergence reflected 
a broader rivalry between reasons-first epistemology, which grounds epistemic normativity in reasons, 
and a family of virtue-theoretic epistemologies, which ground epistemic normativity in competences or 
character traits.  But times are changing, partly thanks to new work on reasons and virtue.  In light of 
this work, some theorists on both sides are revising their views, with some approaches converging.1  
Given the trends, one might be tempted to jump to the Parfitian conclusion that the two parties are 
climbing the mountain from different sides, only to arrive at the same peak.   
But even if this happy conclusion were true, a question would remain about how to best describe 
the view from the peak.  One possibility is that the best view is hybrid.   But a unified theory would be 
nice.  Three options present themselves.  Firstly, one could argue that evidentialism is the fundamental 
truth, and that we can derive VE’s themes from evidentialism properly understood.  Secondly, one could 
argue that VE provides the correct fundamental description, and that evidentialist themes flow from VE 
properly understood.  Thirdly, one could argue that neither is the fundamental truth and we should 
derive both from a third unified theory.   
I’ve come to think the third option is best.  My aim is to defend this thought after explaining 
why evidentialism and VE in their best forms seem to be converging, but why neither is a satisfying 
fundamental theory.  Here is the plan.  After making some preliminary remarks in §2 about how to 
understand evidentialism and VE, I review in §3 why evidentialism needs virtue, but also show that 
there is a natural way to understand evidentialism so that virtue needn’t be added as an extra component.  
But I observe that an explanatory problem remains.  In §4, I use the lingering troubles for evidentialism 
and VE to argue that we shouldn’t use one as the foundation for the other, but simultaneously derive 
both as secondary theories from a third theory.  §5 describes that theory—a novel form of rationalism—
and how it grounds evidence and virtue. 
 
2. Formulating Evidentialism and Virtue Epistemology 
 
Evidentialism is a theory of epistemic justification, and in the first instance propositional justification 
(i.e., justification one possesses to believe or suspend on a proposition, even if one doesn’t do so).  VE, 
by contrast, started as a theory of knowledge, and gradually became a comprehensive theory of 
epistemic normativity (centrally including doxastic justification, the status of justifiedness that attaches 
to doxastic attitudes when properly formed).  It is controversial whether knowledge is partly constituted 
by or even entails justification.2  It is hence unclear whether evidentialism and VE must compete. 
 
1 See Cloos (2015), Lord (2018), Lord and Sylvan (2019), Schmidt (2019), Sosa (forthcoming), Sosa and Sylvan 
(2018), and my efforts in Sylvan (2017) to help responsibilist VE (but as I clarify in (2020a) and (2020b: n.20), I 
am not a virtue epistemologist at the fundamental level).  This trend follows a better-known tradition of attempts 
to integrate evidentialism and reliabilism; see Alston (1988), Comesaña (2010), and Goldman (2011).  Since 
Goldman sometimes calls reliabilism a virtue approach (1993: 274), the two trends might be deemed one. 
As Cloos documents, the original defenders of evidentialism haven’t followed along.  Conee and 
Feldman agree that acquiring perceptual skills causes changes in evidence.  But they insist that the justification 
remains constituted by evidence.  On his own, Feldman (2003: 75) seems to let skill make a more direct 
contribution.  But in their (2011) response to Goldman (2011), Conee and Feldman say that skills only make a 
difference by affecting evidence; in their (2008: 91), they also call virtues mere ‘background conditions’. 
2 See Kornblith (2009), Goldman (1967, 1975) and Sylvan (2018a). 
To develop the thought more, let’s further consider how to formulate the views.  Evidentialism 
is a theory of a normative status (epistemic justification), in a broad sense of ‘normative’ consistent 
with Feldman (1988, 2000)’s ideas.  It could be framed in different ways, since there are different levels 
at which one can theorize about a normative property.  In their first statement of evidentialism, Conee 
and Feldman (1985/2004: 83) offered it not as a reductive account, but just ‘to indicate the kind of 
justification we take to be characteristically epistemic.’  Conee and Feldman (2004: 101) then 
characterized evidentialism by appealing to supervenience: ‘Our bedrock claim is a supervenience 
thesis.  Justification strongly supervenes on evidence.’   But as Beddor (2015) compellingly argues, this 
formulation needs updating owing to the grounding revolution.  Supervenience claims are not 
explanatory in the way theories of justification should be.   
Following Beddor, we should take the core of evidentialism to be a grounding thesis: 
 
Evidentialism-PJ: The total evidence one possesses at t grounds the propositional justification 
for one’s doxastic attitudes at t. 
 
Evidentialists also embrace a claim about doxastic justification (they call it ‘well-foundedness’).  Pure 
evidentialists think we can explain doxastic justification purely in terms of propositional justification 
and non-normative factors, of which the basing relation is an alleged example: 
 
Evidentialism-DJ-Pure: The fact that one’s belief that p is based on sufficient possessed 
evidence grounds the fact that one’s belief is doxastically justified. 
 
To bring views like Cloos (2015)’s into the fold, we might also acknowledge an impurely evidentialist 
view that appeals not to basing simpliciter but rather proper basing, where the propriety is not 
pragmatically encroached upon: 
 
Evidentialism-DJ-Impure: The fact that one’s belief that p is properly based on sufficient 
possessed evidence grounds the fact that one’s belief is doxastically justified. 
 
These formulations reveal two underappreciated places where evidentialists can acknowledge virtue-
theoretic insights: in understanding (i) the possession of sufficient evidence and (ii) (proper) basing on 
evidence.  Evidentialists can allow that manifestations of virtue are necessary for possessing and 
properly basing one’s belief on sufficient evidence.  But they can achieve this without accepting VE.  
Not all necessary conditions are grounds.  So evidentialists may grant the necessary link while denying 
that virtue figures in the analysis of possession and proper basing.   
 A final point of flexibility is worth noting.  Conee and Feldman accept a kind of mentalism on 
which one’s evidence consists in certain non-factive mental states.  But this is not entailed by the 
formulations of evidentialism above.  One could instead take evidence to consist in propositions or 
facts.  It is also consistent with the formulations to understand possession in terms of factive mental 
states like seeing that p.  One could even follow Williamson (2000) and invoke knowledge if it is not 
constituted by justification.  Conee and Feldman won’t like this view.  But it deserves the name 
‘evidentialism’ unless that term is defined to require reference to the two. 
 What about VE?  Again, VE focuses first on knowledge.  Conflict only looms if one accepts 
that knowledge is grounded in justification before being grounded in virtue.  Still, Sosa (2015, 2017) is 
clear that he wants to ground justification in virtue, and Zagzebski’s larger project is fully understanding 
epistemic normativity.  Hence VE makes two claims: 
 
VE-K:  Believing accurately as a manifestation of intellectual virtue grounds knowing. 
 
VE-DJ: Believing (perhaps not accurately) as a manifestation of intellectual virtue grounds 
doxastically justified belief.   
 
Zagzebski and Sosa then disagree about how to understand intellectual virtues.  Sosa sees them as 
competences.  Zagzebski (1996) sees them as motivationally rich character traits.  Although Sosa (2015) 
acknowledges insights in Zagzebski, his fundamental building block is competence.  Similarly, while 
Zagzebski agrees that reliability matters, she gives it only derivative significance.    
 Even understood in this way, there are options for making VE and evidentialism consistent.  
We can distinguish direct and indirect grounding and have a direct VE and an indirect evidentialism or 
vice versa.  One might hold that justified beliefs are first grounded in manifestations of virtue, and then 
ground virtues in evidence-sensitive dispositions.  Or one might ground justified belief in proper basing 
on possessed evidence, but then ground possession and proper basing in virtue (see Sylvan and Sosa 
(2018)).  Old literature overlooks these possibilities.  They give ways to escape problems for both views 
without abandoning the letter of either, as we’ll see. 
 
3. Why Evidence Needs Virtue (and Vice Versa) 
 
3.1. Problems for Evidentialism from VE 
 
Evidentialism has long faced pressure from apparent counterexamples that seem neatly explained by 
VE.  But these examples don’t refute core evidentialist theses.  They only give further reason to 
understand possession and basing so that both entail (but are not constituted by) manifestations of 
virtue.  Along the way, however, we will see other problems that suggest we might want to derive core 
evidentialist theses as secondary truths from deeper rationalist roots. 
 Let’s consider some counterexamples from virtue epistemologists.  The examples divide into 
three groups.  Firstly, some examples suggest that a belief can fit one’s evidence but be unjustified 
owing to one’s epistemically blameworthy ignorance of other easily acquirable evidence; call such 
cases ‘Ignorant Thinker’ cases, where ‘ignorant’ has its ordinary normative sense.  Secondly, some 
examples suggest that a belief can fit one’s evidence but be unjustified because of the vicious way in 
which one bases it on the evidence.  Thirdly, some cases suggest that evidence isn’t necessary for 
justified belief, and that virtue alone does the work. 
 Ignorant Thinker cases are as old as evidentialism, though the early cases didn’t merit quite 
such a pejorative label.  Conee and Feldman (1985/2004: 89) considered a case from Kornblith (1983): 
 
HEADSTRONG PHYSICIST: ‘[Consider] a headstrong young physicist who is unable to 
tolerate criticism.  After presenting a paper to his colleagues, the physicist pays no attention to 
the devastating objection of a senior colleague.  The physicist, obsessed with his own success, 
fails even to hear the objection, which consequently has no impact on his beliefs.’ 
 
They thought the example was underspecified and offered a dilemma: either the physicist realized his 
colleague objected but didn’t hear the details, or he was lost in thought and didn’t realize an objection 
was being made.  In the first specification, they say—reasonably—that evidentialism doesn’t make the 
wrong prediction.3  In the second, they say his relevant beliefs are justified. 
Perhaps that response is tolerable, but more recent Ignorant Thinker cases seem less 
comfortably addressed in this way.  Consider a case from Miracchi (2019: 422): 
 
NUNES MEMO: A Trump supporter has just read the Nunes Memo, which alleges that the FBI 
inappropriately surveilled the 2016 Trump Campaign.  Because he does not read or listen to the 
‘lying liberal media’, he is aware of no reason to doubt that the highly redacted memo supports 
the conclusion it alleges.  He believes the conclusion on this basis. 
 
Miracchi suggests the subject’s objectionably limited evidence does support his conclusion, but that his 
belief is unjustified.  Conee and Feldman’s response is harder to accept here.  
Perhaps one could try to use the first horn of their dilemma and insist that there is relevant 
evidence the Trump supporter has that blocks support for the conclusion (e.g., he knows there are many 
other news outlets that give contrary evidence).  But we can extend the case so that he is so deep within 
his echo chamber that he would be incapable of responding to this evidence even if he were exposed to 
the ‘fake news’ outlets that present it.  The intuition remains. 
 
3 See Conee and Feldman (1985/2004: 90). 
 Evidentialism can address such cases if it rejects Conee and Feldman’s views about reasons, 
possession and proper basing.  Consider the approach from my (2012: 165-6; 2014: Ch.5; 2017: 142-5) 
according to which justified and rational beliefs are beliefs that manifest respect for truth.4  I glossed 
respect for truth in a way that is consistent with the letter of evidentialism.  To manifest full respect for 
truth, a believer must manifest sensitivity to objective evidential relations, where these are relations of 
objective truth-indication.  The Trump supporter does not manifest sensitivity to objective evidential 
relations.5   His evidence is not objectively good.  Even if it were, it would be an accident that he forms 
a belief that fits objectively good evidence, given his insensitivity. 
Admittedly, the second point only directly secures the prediction that the Trump supporter’s 
belief is doxastically unjustified, and some might dislike the first point’s appeal to objectively good 
evidence.  But I am unsure there is a clear intuition about propositional justification if we stipulate that 
he has only positive (objectively good?) evidence.  Clearly, we should say something negative.  But if 
we stipulate that he has only objectively good evidence (a surprising thought!), perhaps we should 
blame the agent for earlier acts which put him in his echo chamber.  We could then grant that there is 
propositional justification within the echo chamber and explain the intuition differently.6   
Even if one stipulates that the Trump supporter has only good evidence and still intuits that he 
lacks propositional justification, other moves are available.  A reasons-firster could first ground doxastic 
justification in sensitivity to objective evidential relations, and then explain propositional justification 
in terms of doxastic justification in the manner of Turri (2010).  Conee and Feldman won’t like this.   
But we shouldn’t be ideal theorists about propositional justification.  Psychological limitations on what 
a person can believe with doxastic justification are limitations on what they have propositional 
justification to believe.  This point doesn’t entail VE. 
 Similar ideas apply to the second class of alleged counterexamples (from Turri (2010)).  Here 
we are meant to imagine that one has sufficient evidence but heeds it by reasoning poorly.  In response, 
we can deny that believing for good reasons is just a matter of believing on the basis of propositions 
that happen to correspond to good reasons.  One must comply with reasons to get justified by them, by 
manifesting sensitivity to the relevant reason-relations.  One manifests no such sensitivity here.   
The final class of examples can’t clearly be addressed in similar ways.  These cases are meant 
to show that heeding evidence is unnecessary for justified belief.  While externalists have long defended 
this conclusion about animal knowledge and some cases of memory belief,7 some of the best examples 
are new, like this case from Srinivasan (forthcoming): 
 
RACIST DINNER TABLE: ‘Nour, a young British woman of Arab descent, is invited to dinner 
at the home of a white friend from university.  The host, Nour’s friend’s father, is polite and 
welcoming to Nour.  He is generous with the food and wine, and asks Nour a series of questions 
about herself.  Everyone laughs and talks amiably.  As Nour comes away, however, she is 
unable to shake the feeling that her friend’s father is racist against Arabs.  But replaying the 
evening in her head she finds it impossible to recover just what actions on the host’s part could 
be thought to be racist, or what would justify her belief in the host’s racism.  If pressed, Nour 
would say she just had a strong feeling that her host was racist: that she ‘just knows’.  In fact 
the host is racist…and as a result did treat Nour in ways subtly different to how he would have 
 
4 Acknowledging Sylvan (2018b) as an influence, Miracchi (2019: §3.1, n.19) and (forthcoming: §3) expands her 
knowledge-first VE to include the concept of proper practical respect for knowledge.  But she continues to 
understand knowledge as the ‘aim’ or ‘objective’ of believing, in line with Miracchi (2014, 2015).   By contrast, 
my notion of respect was from the outset understood as the basis for an alternative to such teleological 
epistemologies; see Sylvan (2012, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2020).  Any aim-based notion of competence cannot, I 
believe, coherently play a fundamental role in an overall theory which also invokes the Kantian notion of respect 
in its core normative story.  But since acts, attitudes, and competences needn’t be understood in terms of aims but 
rather in terms of constitutive norms or values to be respected, it remains possible to invoke a non-teleological 
notion of competent action or attitude-formation.  The appeal to the competences of Reason below is an example.   
5 Compare Lord (2018), Lord and Sylvan (2019), Mantel (2018), and Sylvan and Sosa (2018).  
6 Compare Smith (1983) on culpable ignorance. 
7 See Goldman (1999) and Sosa (2007). 
treated a non-Arab guest. And in fact Nour is subconsciously sensitive to this subtly racist 
behaviour.  It is this subconscious sensitivity that lead to her belief that her host is racist.’8 
 
Srinivasan claims that Nour is justified in believing that the host is racist in virtue of her ‘capacity to 
dependably get on to the truth’ about whether some behavior was racist.  She thinks such cases are 
structurally parallel to BonJour (1980)’s clairvoyance cases, supporting the conclusion that one can be 
justified just by manifesting a disposition to hit the truth.   
 I’m unsure the cases are parallel.  Nour had access to indicators (hence evidence) of racism: the 
indication relations were just subtle and hard-to-articulate.  While she responded by a spontaneous 
sensitivity whose underlying structure is opaque, she was still justified because she picked up on the 
indicators, as a manifestation of sensitivity to them.  We wouldn’t do justice to Nour’s insight if we 
denied that she picked up on genuine indicators of racism.  It is not clear that a subject who wasn’t 
picking up on them would be justified.  BonJour’s Norman is meant to have no indicating evidence.9 
Still, a lingering concern remains: arguably the evidence isn’t doing the real work.  Even if 
Nour had sufficient evidence, her belief seems justified in virtue of a sensitivity that is pre-evidential.  
It is hard to believe her sensitivity has merely causal relevance.10  The relevance seems constitutive.   
This challenge can be strengthened by considering basic beliefs like one’s belief that 1+1=2.  
As Sosa (2007) argues, mere seemings don’t plausibly explain justification any more than mere beliefs 
do.  While one might instead claim that factive rational insight makes evident a perfect reason here, the 
status of <1+1=2>’s evidentness requires epistemic explanation.  Plausibly, certain rational capacities 
both underpin this evidentness and explain why one’s belief is justified. 
 
3.2. Why Virtue Isn’t Enough on its Own 
 
Must we then accept Sosa-style VE?  No, partly because it has problems of its own, and partly because 
there is a rationalist alternative with similar advantages but without similar problems. 
 Sosa’s key concept is the idea of a competence to succeed, where doxastic success is true belief.  
Succeeding as a manifestation of competence is aptness, and knowledge is apt belief.  In Sosa (2007), 
competences were understood as dispositions to succeed relative to suitable situations and assuming the 
performer is in suitable shape.  Such competences can be equally manifest by what Sosa calls mere 
cognitive ‘functionings’ like passive attractions to assent to propositions.  Sosa (2007)’s corresponding 
account of the higher kind of epistemic normativity—what he then called ‘reflective knowledge’—just 
required knowingly hitting the mark of truth through competence, where the higher-order knowledge 
manifests fundamentally the same kind of competence.   
 This early theory doesn’t give a satisfying explanation of what Norman is missing.  First-order 
apt belief is no help: an unenlightened clairvoyant’s beliefs qualify as apt at the first order.  But if first-
order aptness is unsatisfying, it is unclear why apt belief aptly noted would be much better.  Can’t 
second-order apt beliefs be just as blind as first-order ones?   
 Sosa’s view has been twice revised since 2007, but the problem remains.  In his (2010), Sosa 
revised the view so that high-grade knowledge requires not merely second-order aptness, but that one’s 
first-order belief be guided to aptness by a second-order apt judgment.  The trouble here is that the 
higher-order judgment can be just as blind as the first-order judgment.  It is hard to believe that the 
highest epistemic achievement is the blind leading the blind. 
 Sosa (2015)’s view may sound better.  He there understands high-grade knowledge as partly 
constituted by a mental state different in kind from the one constituting animal knowledge.  He 
distinguishes two kinds of belief: mere ‘functional’ beliefs and judgmental beliefs, paradigmatically 
expressed by active judgments.  But although Sosa takes judgmental beliefs to constitute a different 
kind of mental state, they remain subject to fundamentally the same kind of evaluation: judgmental 
knowledge is achieved when one affirms the truth as a manifestation of a competence to affirm only if 
 
8 Srinivasan (forthcoming: 1-2). 
9 I think Norman’s judgment is not justified unless the case is expanded to make clear that it manifests a rational 
capacity.  I do, however, think it is possible for Norman to have animal knowledge even without this detail (though 
see Goldberg and Matheson (forthcoming) for arguments against this view). 
10 See Conee and Feldman (2004), (2008), and (2011) for this tack. 
one’s affirmation would be apt.  A person could have and exercise such a competence while affirming 
in a subjectively reckless way.  Norman, for example, could aptly affirm that he has a clairvoyant power 
and then aptly affirm that Iggy Pop is in Detroit in the endeavor to make an apt affirmation. 
 A concessive response is to combine VE and evidentialism.  One could follow Sylvan and Sosa 
(2018), directly invoking competences to believe p only if p is supported by one’s evidence, and 
piggybacking on evidentialism’s story.  This move yields convergence with the sophisticated 
evidentialist view considered earlier.  But it doesn’t provide a deep solution if one remains within the 
framework of reliabilist VE.  For it is unclear why competences to believe truth with the help of evidence 
should be epistemically better than equally reliable competences to believe truth whether or not one has 
evidence.   
What is needed, I suggest, is a view founded on a different kind of normativity than 
performance normativity, which bears a different relation to truth than the means-end relation of aiming.   
  
4. Convergence and the Task of Unification 
 
Let’s take stock.  Evidentialism can withstand VE’s challenges if it understands some of its moving 
parts in virtue-friendly ways—especially the possession and basing relations.  One compelling option 
begins by taking the fundamental notion of evidence to be the ordinary notion of facts that stand in the 
objective-evidence-for relation to conclusions.  The theory can then understand a subject’s having a 
justified belief as her having a belief based properly on sufficient evidence she possesses, where: 
 
• possessing evidence E for a conclusion h is a matter of  
 
(1) having access to the fact that constitutes that evidence,  
and  
(2) being disposed to treat E as evidence for p as a manifestation of sensitivity to the 
kind of evidential relation holding between E and h;11   
 
• competence with the evidence-for relation between E and h is a matter of being disposed to 
form the attitudes to h-like hypotheses that are fitting when E-like facts obtain; 
 
• belief in h is properly based on E when one holds it because of E, as a manifestation of the 
aforementioned competence. 
 
Although I think this view may be extensionally satisfactory, it faces explanatory challenges.  It is 
unclear that the justifiedness of basic beliefs like the belief that 1+1=2 is fundamentally explained by 
evidence.  It rather seems that exercise of a rational capacity simultaneously explains both the 
evidentness of <1+1=2> and the belief’s status as doxastically justified.   
This concern is connected to a further challenge that emerges from the discussion of VE.  More 
must be said about evidence-sensitive competences.  It doesn’t seem right to understand them as mere 
dispositions: this invites the problems for reliabilist VE.  A natural thought is that these competences 
are rational capacities of the kind that also explain how propositions like <1+1=2> become evident.   
 Explaining the difference between these capacities and mere dispositions to hit some mark 
requires avoiding the problem of clairvoyance.  This problem looks harder considered alongside the 
problems for evidentialism.  Initially, it seemed VE might avoid this problem by mimicking 
evidentialism.  Yet Srinivasan’s question becomes pressing: what is the difference between the 
clairvoyant and someone with a groundless rational intuition of arithmetic truth?   Experiential evidence 
doesn’t make the difference.  All we have is the seeming, which is too belief-like to justify.   
 
11 One might think that it is possible to have E as good evidence for believing P without having the competence 
to treat E as evidence for P.  But I argue against this view in Sylvan (2015).  I agree it is possible to have E as 
evidence in these cases, but not as sufficient evidence for believing P. 
 The lingering problems for evidentialism and VE make me wary of explaining their 
convergence by founding one on the other.  I suggest we seek a third theory that can simultaneously 
provide foundations for each as secondary theories—in particular, a rationalist theory.12   
 
5. Rationalist Foundations for Evidence and Virtue 
 
The theory begins with a simple idea and pushes it farther than the traditional name suggests is possible.  
The simple idea can be grasped by considering Srinivasan’s question about the difference between the 
intuition that 2+2=4 and Norman’s belief.  The rationalist’s answer is that the former is a manifestation 
of reason, while the latter is not, where reason is understood as a fundamental mental capacity.  More 
generally, rationalists claim that reason confers the status of evidence on propositions and also confers 
the status of virtue on dispositions (including the ones involved in possession and proper basing).   
I will first explain the rationalist account of evidence, then the rationalist account of virtue, and 
then show how these accounts yield the convergence of evidentialism and VE.  It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to fully defend rationalism.  Here I suggest only that if evidentialism and VE need revisions 
that lead to extensional convergence, then rationalism should underpin both as secondary theories. 
 
4.1. Rationalist Foundations for Evidence (and a Derivative Evidentialism) 
 
My rationalism is inspired not by 17th century metaphysicians, but rather by Kantian ethicists with 
compelling analyses of practical normativity—viz., Korsgaard (2009) and Markovits (2014).  A virtue 
of the view is that it smoothly integrates with this other Kantian project.   
The first step toward the view is not specifically Kantian or rationalist.  It involves defining 
normative reasons as potential inputs to good reasoning, where ‘reasoning’ is understood broadly to 
include transitions like the transition from seeing that p to judging that p.13  It then adds a distinctively 
rationalist claim about the source of the standards of good reasoning: 
 
Kantian Rationalism: The norms of reasoning are constitutive norms of the power of reason—
i.e., norms one must be minimally disposed to follow to count as engaging in reasoning, or 
possessing the power of reason, at all. 
 
In the case of reason’s theoretical side, the constitutive norms include principles of deductive reasoning 
and—following Strawson (1952) and BonJour (1998) on induction—fundamental principles of 
ampliative reasoning.  On a natural extension inspired by Peacocke (2000)'s moderate rationalism, one 
could also count the introduction and exit rules constitutive of some acquired concepts among these 
norms, to explain the rationality of other transitions.  Since constitutive norms of theoretical reason are 
plausibly a priori, this view explains why reason-relations seem a priori. 
 What is evidence?  The notion of evidence is Janus-faced in a way that makes the full rationalist 
story multifaceted.  On the one hand, there is the relational notion of evidence as a fact that bears an 
evidence-for relation to a proposition.  To be evidence in this sense is to be a theoretical reason for 
believing the proposition.  A theoretical reason is, in turn, a potential input to good theoretical reasoning.  
Different kinds of evidence will be distinguished by the class to which the constitutive norms of the 
relevant reasoning belong.  Admittedly, the ordinary notion of evidence seems more restrictive, so that 
it is only proper to call inputs to good ampliative reasoning ‘evidence’.  But evidentialism always 
invoked a wider notion, making it hard to distinguish from reasons-based views that sound broader.   
 The fundamental sort of evidence in this ordinary relational sense is objective: evidence consists 
in worldly facts.  But only possessed evidence can do much work in epistemology.  Possession is a 
further work of reason.  A person possesses a fact E as evidence for a proposition p only if that person 
is not just minimally attuned to the relevant evidential relation, but is disposed to treat the evidence in 
the right way, by forming the attitudes it favors.  This disposition can be masked if one is sleepy, 
 
12 Srinivasan (forthcoming) considers a theory she calls ‘rationalist’, which only addresses one of her cases.  But 
it is a limited rationalism that just invokes a priori justification for moral propositions.  My theory explains more, 
by being less limited. 
13 See Gregory (2016), Silverstein (2016) and Way (2017). 
distracted, or whatever.  But possession requires real grasp of relevant evidence-for relations.  That 
grasp is constituted by reason-based dispositions to think according to reason’s constitutive standards.   
 Rational attunement of this kind is one necessary condition on possessing a fact E as a certain 
kind of evidence for p.  It must also be true that this fact is itself evident to one (or in a position to 
become so).  Here we encounter a different use of the notion of evidence.  This use appears when people 
talk about one’s ‘body of evidence’ in abstraction from the evidence-for relations that its members bear 
to propositions.  What is one’s ‘body of evidence’?  A narrow view would be that it is the set of 
propositions whose truth is evident to one.  A wider view would be that it is the set of propositions that 
one’s reason is in a position to make evident to one. 
 A full rationalist picture must also explain what it is for a proposition to be evident to a person.  
Here we can adopt Kantian thinking familiar through McDowell (1995).  One might have wanted to 
ground empirical evidence in sensory experience.  But if sensory experience consists in Dretske 
(2000)’s simple sensing of particulars, features, events, and states of affairs reportable by claims of the 
form ‘S sees/hears/smells NP’, then it is not sufficient to make a part of the world evident to one.  I can 
bear the simple seeing relation to a state of affairs reportable by the proposition that p without seeing 
that p; I can walk past a street performance, for example, without realizing that it is one.  As Kant 
suggested, sensation provides matter without form.  Only reason enables one to transform the simple 
seeing of parts of a state of affairs into the seeing that it obtains.  We can use ‘experience’ in a wider 
sense to include seeing that p.  But seeing that p is a complex state, and the sensory constituent is blind 
to truth.  Only reason enables us to see empirical truths. 
 Reason also enables us to see non-empirical truths.  Here the seeing is intuition.  In principle, 
we could imagine reason descrying contingent truths without evident help from sensory matter.  Some 
perception works in this way (e.g., proprioception).  But if it is clear BonJour’s Norman lacks a justified 
belief,14 we cannot suppose Norman deploys reason in this way, where non-evident matter is used to 
render some truth evident.  Hence the difference between Norman and Nour.     
 With these ideas in hand, we can give a fuller rationalist account of evidence, and derive 
evidentialism as a secondary truth.  We can begin with the non-relational notion of evidence, and invoke 
that to give a fuller account of the possession of relational evidence: 
 
Non-Relational Evidence: E is part of S’s evidence =dfmetaphysical E is a member of the set of 
truths that S’s reason is in a position to make evident to S, where the evidentness of a truth to 
S consists in S’s attraction to this truth as a manifestation of S’s theoretical reason (where reason 
may use other materials—e.g., sensations—to generate this attraction).     
 
Possessed Relational Evidence: A person S possesses E as evidence of some sort for p 
=dfmetaphysical (1) E is evident to S in the foregoing sense, and (2) S is disposed by reason to treat 
E as evidence of this sort for p, where this involves S’s being disposed to believe p-like 
propositions when E-like propositions are evident, according to a relevant principle of reason. 
 
Objective evidence, in turn, just consists in facts that are potential inputs to good theoretical reasoning, 
where that is grounded in the foregoing Kantian way.   
 Whither evidentialism?  Consider a rationalist account of justified belief: a belief is doxastically 
justified iff it manifests the power of theoretical reason.  Theoretical reason operates by taking certain 
facts as input.  These are evidence.  If reason manifests its power by moving from some facts to a 
conclusion, the conclusion will be based on evidence.  Hence it emerges as a derived truth that a 
conclusion is justified iff properly based on evidence.  But reason is what makes the evidence evident. 
 
4.2. Rationalist Foundations for Virtue (and a Derivative VE) 
 
Rationalism’s ability to subsume evidentialism’s good predictions is unsurprising.  Rationalism and 
evidentialism are old friends.   But reliabilist VE might seem too different to sustain a lasting friendship 
with rationalism.  Indeed, one might think it clear that virtue is not a rationalist notion.  One might 
 
14 If we fill in the details of the Norman case so that reason is playing the role, we rightly get a different 
intuition.  This point is a relative of one in Lyons (2009). 
hence be skeptical about deriving VE from rationalism.  Moreover, one might suspect the greater 
generality of virtue makes it a better ground for normativity, some of which is unreflective. 
 The generality of virtue is, however, not a boon if we want to explain the normativity attaching 
to works of agency and states for which we are properly held accountable.  Paperweights and toasters 
display virtues in the most general sense.  It is a virtue of this paperweight that it prevents the paper 
from flying away when it is windy.  It is a virtue of this toaster that it browns the toast just right.  Virtues 
in the general sense are just useful qualities.  Yet it is wrong to analyze justified beliefs as beliefs that 
are produced by virtues in this sense.  VE needs a narrower notion. 
 We could stipulate a narrower notion: namely, the notion of a disposition of a person to enter a 
desirable state (e.g., true belief).  In Sosa’s early efforts, intellectual virtues were understood this way.  
But this way doesn’t illuminate the problem of clairvoyance.  Nor does it really illuminate animal 
knowledge, as Sosa (2015) recognizes: a competence to form true beliefs is not just a disposition to 
form them, but rather a special case of a disposition to form them.  How should we specify this special 
case?  Sosa (2015) offers no answer and takes the notion of competence as primitive.  Yet competences 
are a special case of virtues in the wider sense.  A VE analogous to virtue ethics would appeal to virtue 
and then analyze other normative properties in terms of virtues and non-normative properties.    
 Rationalism enables us to explain which dispositions are virtues of the relevant sort for 
explaining normative statuses like justification and rationality.  Not just any dispositions will do.  We 
want competences.  What makes a disposition a competence?  The rationalist story is reminiscent of the 
account of skill developed by Bradford (2015) and Stanley and Williamson (2017).  Competences are 
intelligent dispositions, dispositions ‘guided’ by reason.  But it is best to understand this guidance as 
consisting in the deployment of reason through the disposition, rather than the occupying of some 
higher-order state: otherwise the view threatens overintellectualization.  The dispositions are 
dispositions of reason in the broad sense needed in a comprehensive rationalism for the theoretical and 
practical domains.   They are intelligent and amount to competences in virtue of this fact. 
Whither VE?  Consider again the simple rationalist account of justified belief.  A belief will be 
doxastically justified iff it manifests the power of theoretical reason.  Theoretical reason does, however, 
manifest its power through the workings of various dispositions.  It works through virtues, though they 
count as virtues in the relevant sense by hailing from reason.  Hence it emerges that a belief will be 
justified iff it manifests certain intellectual virtues.  But the relevant virtues are seated in reason.  No 
others are suited to explain justified belief (as the clairvoyant augured). 
 
4.3. Explaining Convergence and Other Advantages 
 
From a rationalist account of justified belief, then, we can derive evidentialism and VE in secondary 
forms.  According to rationalism, what fundamentally explains the justifiedness of a given belief is the 
fact that it manifests the power of theoretical reason.  In the case of non-basic beliefs, the power of 
theoretical reason will always be manifest in one’s basing one’s belief on independently identifiable 
evidence.  Here rationalism is extensionally equivalent to evidentialism.  But it gives a better 
explanation in the case of basic beliefs.  Hence, a belief will be justified in rationalist terms iff it is 
justified in suitable evidentialist terms, but rationalism is the more fundamental theory. 
 Parallel claims hold for rationalism and reliabilist VE.  Manifestations of reason always work 
through what VE calls ‘competences’, but reason is more fundamental.  Hence, a belief will be justified 
in rationalist terms iff it is justified in sophisticated virtue reliabilist terms.  Yet rationalism is again the 
basic theory.  It gives a better explanation of the difference between Norman and the person who intuits 
a necessary truth or enjoys a sensationless perception of contingent truth.   
 We hence get a derivation of evidentialism and VE as secondary theories and also explain why 
these theories converge in their best forms.  The resulting unified outlook is preferable to a hybrid 
outlook.  Of course, one could also avoid hybridity by trying instead to derive evidentialism from VE 
or vice versa.  But these alternatives give worse explanations of some basic beliefs.  Moreover, 
rationalism seamlessly integrates with what is arguably the best approach to practical normativity—
viz., Kantianism, which avoids the relativism of Humeanism and the spookiness of non-naturalist 
realism, and better explains the normative significance of reasons and rationality than neo-
Aristotelianism (which I also suspect invite excessive relativism).15 
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